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Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?
In drafting a statute legislators delineate categories of persons fa-
vored or disfavored by the operation of the law. Depending upon
their assessment of the costs and benefits of greater individualization,
lawmakers are more or less precise in identifying those people hav-
ing the characteristic or characteristics relevant in terms of effectuat-
ing the purposes of the law. The classification chosen, therefore, is
typically imperfect but made nonetheless because, in the legislator's
judgment, it will serve the legislative purposes well enough; the in-
creased benefits promised by a more discriminating classification, on
the other hand, would be outweighed by the added costs of estab-
lishing and administering a more precise classification.
In light of these practical considerations of legislative classifica-
tion, it is not surprising that legislators have often employed the
class of mentally ill persons' as a convenient shorthand. By equating
mental illness with such characteristics as dangerousness, irrationality,
dependence, and irresponsibility, the lawmaker has immensely sim-
plified many classification problems. If the legislature wishes to keep
guns out of the hands of dangerous persons, for example, it can
1. "Mental illness" has been variably defined in both medical and legal circles. A
discussion of the definitional problems attending "mental health" offers insight into the
bases of disagreement among psychiatrists:
Definitions obviously vary with the perspective of the definers, the point of reference
used, and the values considered important. Thus, the psychoanalytic perspective
focuses on the intrapsychic life of the individual. . . . Here the value is awareness
of unconscious motivations and self-control based upon these insights. The inter-
personal frame of reference, on the other hand, is more concerned with the func-
tioning of individuals in interpersonal situations . . . . [This frame] places major
value on effective and efficient social functioning. The social relatedness per-
spective . . . focuses on the individual's relationship with the larger social en-
vironment. . . Here the values are humanism, individualism, freedom and
rationality.
Schwartz & Schwartz, Mental Health: The Concept, 10 INT'L ENCYC. SOC. Sci. 215, 216
(D. Sills ed. 1968) (emphasis in original); cf. Dodd v. Hughes, 81 Nev. 43, 46, 398 P.2d
540, 542 (1965). The legal definitions of "mental illness" codified by -the individual
states also vary widely. For a comprehensive listing, see THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND
THE LAW 66-71 (S. Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971) (Table 3.1) [hereinafter cited as BrLAKEL
& ROCK]. Variable application of similar laws is virtually assured, moreover, because
these legal definitions are typically "vague and ambiguous." See Hearings on the Con-
stitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subconzin. on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 193 (1961) (statement of
Professor Hugh A. Ross). See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-501 (1967): "'[M]ental illness'
means a psychosis or other disease which substantially impairs the mental health of a
person." Despite this lack of consensus on the meaning of "mental illness," legislators
have readily correlated the mental illness label with stereotypical characteristics for
purposes of legislative classification. See pp. 1237-38, 1260-68 infra.
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single out the mentally ill as a dangerous class and thereby secure
a rather rough but inexpensive approximation of its goal.2 Or legis-
lators may translate their concern that people be treated by compe-
tent doctors into a blanket prohibition against the award of medical
licenses to the mentally ill.3 Promoting informed exercise of the
franchise, securing a jury of one's peers, minimizing marital dis-
harmony-these legislative concerns and numerous others with which
few persons may quarrel in principle have become the source of
laws which classify on the basis of mental illness to the great detri-
ment of the mentally ill.
4
Civil commitment statutes, however-the most familiar employ-
ment of the mental illness classification and the usual source of the
finding of mental illness central to the administration of the above
statutes-appear to disadvantage the mentally ill for reasons other
than a cost-benefit determination of the advantages of greater indi-
vidualization in classification. For these laws typically require a
present adjudication of dangerousness or need of treatment and of
mental illness:5 At least in principle, therefore, the latter cannot-
as it indeed can with licensing or voting laws-supply the character-
istic relevant to the legislative goal. Why use the classification at
all, then?
This Note seeks to answer that question and to raise others fun-
damental to the validity of laws classifying on the basis of mental
illness by inquiring into the rationale underlying the equal pro-
tection doctrine of suspect classifications. More specifically, it will
argue that classification on the basis of mental illness is constitu-
tionally "suspect" and therefore warrants the standard of review tra-
ditionally given suspect classifications. After establishing the theoret-
ical basis for this proposition, the Note will examine the conse-
quences of treating mental illness as a suspect classification. Finally,
it will, in recognition of recent developments in equal protection
theory, attempt to demonstrate that declaring mental illness a sus-
pect classification would be consistent with the Burger Court's ap-
parent conception of the judiciary's appropriate role in reviewing
legislative decisions.
2. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(4) (1970).
3. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-613(11) (Supp. 1969). For a complete libting of
similar laws, see B]RAKEL & RocK, supra note 1, at 326-32 (Table 9.3).
4. See pp. 1267-68 infra.
5. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INsr'Ns CODE § 5150 (West 1972). See generally BRA r.L &
RocK, supra note 1, at 72-76 (Table 3.2).
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I. Traditional Treatment of the Question
A. Standards of Judicial Review under the
Equal Protection Clause-Generally
The significance of regarding classifications by mental illness as
suspect becomes apparent only in the context of a broader discussion
of equal protection doctrine. Basically, the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution requires each state to treat persons equally. This
does not mean that a state lawmaker must regard all citizens as the
same, ignoring their diversity; state laws are expected to take dif-
ferences among the citizenry into account. Rather, this clause's de-
mand of equality is a mandate to give equal treatment to persons
similarly situated-or, from another perspective, to treat people dif-
ferently only on the basis of differences among them relevant to
effectuating lawful legislative purposes. In general, the Supreme
Court, as ultimate arbiter of state compliance with the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, leaves state legislatures free to classify imperfectly to
serve legitimate goals as long as the classification bears a rational, or
plausible, relation to those goals.7 The persistence of the laws noted
above employing the mental illness classification to secure legislative
ends witnesses the leeway typically allowed in legislative classification.
But judicial review of the legislative decision is not always as re-
laxed as the survival of these laws singling out the mentally ill may
imply. If the Court determines that a statute either deprives some
persons of a "fundamental interest"8 or employs a "suspect classifi-
cation"9 in creating categories of persons favored or disfavored by its
operation, the Court will not tolerate merely a rational connection
6. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. Railvay Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), exemplifies the ra-
tional relation test. Under review was a New York City traffic regulation that allowed
business vehicle owners to carry on their vehicles advertisements of their own business
but not advertisements of the businesses of others. Accepting as the legislative goal
the promotion of traffic safety, the Court held the classification valid on the ground that
the local authorities may well have concluded that those who advertise their own
wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic problem [as those who
advertise others' wares] in view of the nature or extent of the advertisement which
they use.
Id. at 110. See McGowan v. Maryland, 566 U.S. 420 (1961); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457
(1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See generally Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
8. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956) (equal access to appellate review in criminal cases).
9. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Johnson v. Virginia, 373
U.S. 61 (1963); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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between the legislative goal and the classification chosen to imple-
ment it. Rather, it will subject the law under review to "strict
scrutiny," invalidating it unless the classification appears calculated
to serve the legislature's end with a far higher degree of precision
than ordinarily required. And indeed, almost without exception, the
Court's announcement that strict scrutiny is applicable has signaled
an ultimate finding that the law under review is unconstitutional."'
In the 1971 term the Court evolved yet a third standard of re-
view in equal protection cases. On occasion, although the Court
suggested that it was demanding only a rational connection be-
tween the legislative classification and goal, it struck down laws
probably valid under the traditional rationality test." And appar-
ently this new rationality standard required something less than the
precision in classification needed to survive strict scrutiny: On the
one hand, the Court upheld "rational" classifications which would
probably be invalid under a strict scrutiny standard12 and, on the
other hand, the Court continued to invoke the latter standard ex-
plicitly in some cases.13
From the perspective of a plaintiff challenging the constitutionality
of mental illness classifications, therefore, the optimal result would
be to trigger the strict scrutiny standard of review. The new "sliding-
scale"' 4 rationality test may suffice to bring about the desired re-
sult, but the uncertainties of review under this standard are already
amply documented, especially in the wealth classification area.'0 Strict
10. The exceptions are Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); cf. Lee
v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black, Harlan & Stewart, JJ., concurring).
11. E.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33 (1972):
There is no doubt that the intensity of review in these .. . cases is higher than
that associated with the extremely deferential old equal protection. In all of the
cases, the Court was less willing to strain for conceivable justifications, less ready
to hypothesize imaginable facts that might underlie questionable classifications, less
inclined to tolerate substantial over- and underinclusiveness in deference to legis-
lative flexibility.
Compare Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), with Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
12. E.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971). See Gunther, supra note 11, at 13-14.
13. E.g., Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
14. See Gunther, supra note 11, at 17-18.
15. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); James
v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); James v. Valtierra,
402 U.S. 137 (1971). Had the Warren Court explicitly declared wealth classifications
suspect-rather than simply intimate the like, see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966)-those recent cases that were decided adversely to the
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scrutiny, on the other hand, would be a virtual guarantee of suc-
cess. 10 A declaration that the classification is suspect would obviate
the necessity for case-by-case decisionmaking regarding the applicable
standard of review; strict scrutiny would henceforth be the test for
all mental illness classifications.
17
B. Some Attempts to Elucidate the Criteria Informing Suspect Clas-
sifications: Implications for Classification by Mental Illness
The Supreme Court has indicated, with varying degrees of ex-
plicitness, that certain classifications are' or are not' 9 suspect. It has
not, however, articulated the criteria used in deciding whether or
not a classification is suspect. McLaughlin v. Florida,20 in which
the Court invalidated a law prohibiting cohabitation by unmarried
biracial couples, contains perhaps the clearest statement by a majority
of the Court on the matter. Mr. Justice White, writing for the Court,
emphasized that:
plaintiffs (i.e., all of the above except James v. Strange, and Lindsey v. Normet in part)
would almost certainly have gone the other way.
In the sex classification cases, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the
Court has uniformly struck down the law or practice under review as irrational. Never-
theless, although the Court's failure to declare classification by sex suspect has made
no difference to the outcome in these cases, it may well make the crucial difference
in a future sex classification, for the Court will be free to tolerate imperfection in
classification provided it meets the minimal rationality standard.
16. In his celebration of sliding-scale rationality as a check on legislative choice of
means, Professor Gunther points out that the Court tolerates imperfect classifications
under this standard where it recognizes "legitimate demands for legislative flexibility."
Gunther, supra note 11, at 47-48. Since this "legitimacy" would seem to be nothing
more at this point than a conclusory label affixed by the Court-i.e., not an objec-
tively verifiable quality-Professor Gunther has obscured, but not really refuted, the
existence of unfettered discretion on the Court's part in applying a sliding-scale test.
17. The repercussions throughout the nation's judicial system after the Court declares
a classification to be suspect should not be overlooked. The Court's failure to make
such a declaration about classification by sex, for example, leaves state and federal
courts broad discretion in reviewing sex classifications, the Court's consistency in such
matters thus far notwithstanding.
18. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954) (race); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (nationality).
19. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (wealth). Although the Court on
one occasion strongly intimated that illegitimacy of birth is not suspect, Labine v.
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), it has since appeared to have withdrawn from its earlier
pronouncement. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). Indeed, in
Weber the Court went far in limiting Labine to its facts as a manifestation of the
special considerations obtaining in the estates field, id. at 170-72, and unequivocally
approved, id. at 167-70, the authority of Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), whose
intimation of the suspect status of illegitimacy Labine had appeared to dispel.
The Court studiously avoided deciding whether sex is suspect in Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971), where it struck down as "irrational" a law favoring men over women
in estate administration contests. Subsequent cases have also left the issue open, though
in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), four members of the Court explicitly
subscribed to sex's suspect status.
20. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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[W]e deal here with a classification based upon the race of the
participants, which must be viewed in light of the historical fact
that the central purpose of the 14th Amendment was to eliminate
racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States.
This strong policy renders racial classifications "constitutionally
suspect," Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, . . . and subject
to the "most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216, . . . and "in most circumstances irrelevant" to
any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose, Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 .... 21
The allusion to a "central purpose" criterion would seem to con-
stitute a rather unequivocal explanation by the Court of its under-
standing of what makes a classification suspect. And if this is indeed
the test for suspect classifications, there should be little question
that classification by mental illness is outside of its scope.
The very next sentence in the quoted portion of McLaughlin,
however, warns against reading its preceding statement as an an-
nouncement of a central purpose theory, for the Court cites Kore-
matsu and Hirabayashi, cases affirming that classifications based on
nationality are suspect. A contradiction is thus apparent: Since the
history of the Fourteenth Amendment indicates that its framers' focus
was on that group whose subjugation had only recently fueled a
major war between the states of the Union-the black race-and not
upon ancestral minorities,22 the Court cannot consistently adhere to
a central purpose theory and simultaneously reiterate its approval
of earlier cases holding nationality to be a suspect classification. Simi-
larly irreconcilable with a central purpose criterion, furthermore,
is the Court's subsequent addition of classification on the basis of
alienage to the suspect circle.2 3 If mental illness is not a suspect
classification, the central purpose argument hardly seems an adequate
explanation.
24
On the other hand, this theory may not be as insubstantial as
the preceding discussion makes it out to be. Thus one might con-
strue the theory to embrace classifications by nationality and alien-
age because they are "like" race.2 5 Whether mental illness is enough
21. Id. at 191-92.
22. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70-72 (1873). See also Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880).
23. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
24. The most recent affirmation of the central purpose criterion belongs to Mr.
Justice Rehnquist. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
25. Cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 61 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 681 n.3 (1966)
(Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
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like race to meet the test of this refurbished precedent-conscious
theory is unclear-and for good reason: This theory asserts that na-
tionality and alienage are like race but is conspicuously silent as to
just how. Thus, rather than advance the inquiry, this similarity cri-
terion obfuscates the issues and implicitly restates the original ques-
tion of what criteria define a suspect classification..
2
6
Other theories, though, which have eschewed such logical cir-
cularity and have attempted to pinpoint precisely what about racial
classifications summons strict scrutiny, provide a firmer basis for
characterizing classification by mental illness as suspect or not. One
view, for example, regards as controlling the opprobrium which
racial classifications cast upon blacks.27 Classification on the basis of
mental illness would seem to burden the mentally ill with similar
stigma or opprobrium, for these laws, in which mental illness is a
shorthand for various undesirable attributes, affirm to the mentally
ill that others view them as inferiors.28 The opprobrium theory,
however, is not without serious problems: Basically, although stigma
is admittedly an explicit concern in many racial classification cases,
this theory may be mistaking one type of harm commonly caused
by suspect classifications with a requisite common denominator. The
attention devoted to establishing opprobrium in various race cases,
therefore, may be explained by the need to show some actual dis-
advantage resulting from the classification-the sine qua non of any
equal protection claim.
29
Another theory fixes on the unchangeableness of race as the source
of suspicion about racial classifications.30 How this criterion would
26. And, again, as McLaughlin infers, the Court has been distinctively unhelpful
in clarifying such matters. The following from Boiling v. Sharpe typifies the Court's
elucidation of its reasoning on the essence of suspect classifications:
Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care,
since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
27. See, e.g., Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,
426-27 (1960).
28. See M. SCHWARTZ & C. SCHWARTZ, SOCIAL APPROACIIES TO MENTAL PATIENT CARE
9 (1964) [hereinafter cited as SCHwARTZ & SCHwARTZ].
29. Thus, in cases subsequent to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), where
the Court emphasized that the stigma of racial classification retarded blacks' educational
development, federal courts invalidated laws sanctioning separate but equal facilities
where stigma did not seem to impair the black facilities' functional equivalence. See,
e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122, 123 (5th
Cir.), aff'd, 358 U.S. 54 (1958); Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 220 F.2d 386, 387 (4th
Cir.), afj'd, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
30. The origins of this theory may lie in Justice Jackson's eloquent dissent in
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 243 (1944):
But here is an attempt to make an otherwise innocent act a crime merely because
this prisoner is the son of parents as to whom he had no choice, and belongs
to a race from which there is no way to resign.
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apply to classification by mental illness is rather in doubt. Basically,
the permanence of mental illness is a matter about which reason-
able men may, and indeed do, differ. One prominent psychiatrist
dichotomizes the diversity of opinion on this matter:
The old point of view assumed that most mental illness was
progressive and refractory. The new point of view is that most
mental illness serves its purpose and disappears, and does so
more rapidly and completely when skillfully understood and dealt
with.31
There are, however, those who, though not of the "old" point of
view, regard mental illness as permanent because they see it as a
tendency to gravitate toward the end of the continuum of mental
health opposite to that portion which is arbitrarily labeled "nor-
mal."' 32 In addition, some, though not of the "new" point of view,
consider mental illness to be impermanent because they feel that
it is a state that can in some sense be willfully entered into and
abandoned. 33 A court adhering to a permanent characteristic theory
could thus decide whether mental illness is a suspect classification
only with great difficulty.34 The question, though, may simply be
academic: Unless the Court is ready to overrule Graham v. Richard-
son35 and later cases36 holding alienage to be a suspect classification,
it cannot logically subscribe to a permanent characteristic criterion.
On the other hand, perhaps this theory can be read more broadly
to have as its touchstone not an unchangeable characteristic but in-
Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion); San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). See generally Note, The
Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE LJ. 573, 576 & n.11 (1973).
31. K. MENNINGER, THE VITAL BALANCE 2 (1963).
32. See S. FREUD, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS (1924). See also
SCHWARTZ & SCHWARTZ, supra note 28, at 12-13.
33. See, e.g., R. LAING, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE (1967). In recounting the "psy-
chotic episode," id. at 146, of one Jesse Watkins, Dr. Laing writes:
But he trusted his experience of having entered into a state of more, not less,
reality, of hypersanity, not subsanity. To others, these two possibilities may be
no more distinguishable from each other than chalk from cheese. He had to be
careful. . . . Jesse felt that this experience was a stage that everyone would
have to go through one way or another in order to reach a higher stage of
evolution. . . . Eventually he felt he couldn't "take" any more. He decided
to come back.
Id. at 157-59 (emphasis in original).
34. Under this theory, the fact that a legislature regards mental illness as im-
permanent when it employs a mental illness classification does not mean that the
court must decide that the classification is not suspect. The court's focus is not
legislative intent but rather the ability of the members of the class to withdraw from
that class.
35. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
36. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
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stead something closer to one very difficult to change. If so, mental
illness, even if regarded as impermanent, may be "permanent enough"
for this theory.
Analysis of these two leading theories of suspect classification thus
reveals at least some support for the proposition that classification
by mental illness is "like" classification by race and, accordingly,
should be subject to strict scrutiny. Neither of these theories nor
the central purpose formulation, however, provides a very satisfac-
tory explanation of what the Court means when it calls a classifica-
tion suspect. In the following pages this Note will develop a theory
articulating what has moved the Court historically to declare clas-
sifications suspect and which should therefore guide it in future
cases examining other classifications such as mental illness.
II. A Theory for Suspect Classifications
A. The We-They Foundation
37
A clue to what the Court means when it calls a classification sus-
pect may lie in what the Court does when it so labels it. Most
obviously, the Court announces its intention to give the classification
"strict scrutiny." Less obvious, however, is what the Court has there-
by committed itself to do next. The Court's language in some of
the suspect classification cases strongly suggests that the Court's ex-
ercise of strict scrutiny is equivalent to a demand that the classifi-
cation chosen be precisely suited to serve a permissible state objec-
tive38-that is, the classification must be neither over- nor underin-
clusive. Thus the majority in Loving v. Virginia asserted:
37. This subsection is based in large part on the "we-they" theory briefly outlined
by Professor John Hart Ely in a footnote to The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 933 n.85 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ely, The Wages
of Crying Wolf], and expounded at length by him in an unpublished paper. J.H. Ely,
Judicial Review of Suspicious Classifications: Why is Classification by Race "Suspect,"
and Should Classification by Sex Similarly be Subjected to Extraordinary Scrutiny?,
Spring 1971 (on file with the Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Ely]. All ref-
erences to the latter are made with the permission of the author, whose generosity
is acknowledged with great appreciation by the writer of this Note. All substantial
departures from Professor Ely's theory are indicated in the footnotes. Differences in
emphasis or in cases relied upon to support the same propositions are generally not
noted.
38. This correlation, which does not appear to have been made by previous com-
mentators, was very explicitly drawn by Professor Ely in his 1971 essay. Ely C6-14. For
support he relies on Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S.
19 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that
racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be
subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny" . . . and, if they are ever
to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the ac-
complishment of some permissible state objective. 39
In this statement the Court appears to be demanding a perfect, or
near perfect, classification. This standard is arguably dictum, how-
ever, since the case may be read as one in which the statute under
review, one prohibiting miscegenation, was designed to achieve an
impermissible state objective-specifically, "to maintain White Su-
premacy." 4
0
Korematsu41 and Hirabayashi,42 the Japanese internment cases,
also suggest that the Court's focus in suspect classification cases is
the relative perfection of the classification. In language not easily
dismissed as dictum, they strongly imply that the applicable test is
not perfection in classification but rather the most precise classi-
fication possible under the circumstances. Most probative perhaps in
this respect is the following rationale offered by the Korematsu
Court for upholding suspect classifications in both cases:
Like curfew, exclusion of those of Japanese origin was [in Hira-
bayashi] deemed necessary because of the presence of an unas-
certainable number of disloyal members of the group, most of
whom we have no doubt were loyal to this country. It was be-
cause we could not reject the finding of the military authorities
that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation
of the disloyal from the loyal that we sustained the validity of
the curfew order as applying to the whole group. In the instant
case, temporary exclusion of the entire group was rested by the
military on the same ground.43
39. 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
40. Id. at 11. A permissible state objective is not necessarily a compelling state
objective. Unless the Court can pierce the veil of alleged legislative purposes and find
only an unlawful objective, the statute in issue will survive a permissible state interest
test. Though not clearly decided on equal protection grounds, Anderson v. Martin, 375
U.S. 339, 404 (1964), seems to exemplify a finding of impermissible state interest:
we view the alleged equality [the requirement that the race of all contestants for
public office appear on the ballot] as superficial. Race is the factor upon which
the statute operates and its involvement promotes the ultimate discrimination
which is sufficient to make it invalid.
On the other hand, a compelling state interest is not simply lawful but significant
enough, in the Court's judgment, to outweigh whatever other interest appears to be
jeopardized by its promotion. The inapplicability of a compelling state interest test
to suspect classifications is discussed at pp. 1251-52 infra.
41. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
42. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
43. 323 U.S. at 219 (emphasis added).
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Here the Court makes explicit its concern about imperfection of
the classification: that segregation of some but not all Japanese na-
tionals would serve the interests of national security, since some but
not all are disloyal.44 Nevertheless, in this time of national emergency,
the Court was willing to tolerate an imperfect classification as the
best that the commanding general could manage in his presidentially-
authorized order under the circumstances. 45 In the Court's view, then,
the need to take immediate measures to protect internal security
excused the employment of Japanese nationality as a shorthand for
the evils at which the order was aimed.
Finally, a brief concurring opinion in Lee v. Washington,46 a per
curiam decision, also appears to equate strict scrutiny with a rule
allowing deviation from perfection in classification only when cir-
cumstances dictate that some serviceable classification be formulated
at once.47 In that concurrence three of the justices reiterated their
agreement with the Lee Court's prohibition against racial segregation
in prisons but hastened to add that the Court's opinion did not
prevent prison officials from segregating prisoners along racial lines
as a temporary relief measure to handle outbreaks of racial hostility.48
44. The Court does not expressly acknowledge the patent underinclusiveness of the
internment measure: its failure to reach disloyal persons not of Japanese ancestry.
Compare the following from Hirabayashi:
Because racial discriminations are in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore
prohibited, it by no means follows that, in dealing with the perils of war, Con-
gress and the Executive are wholly precluded from taking into account those facts
and circumstances which are relevant to measures for our national defense and
for the successful prosecution of the war, and which may in fact place citizens
of one ancestry in a different category from others.
320 U.S. at 100.
45. The executive order, "issued after we were at war with Japan, declared that
'the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage
and against sabotage .... ." 323 U.S. at 217. The Court readily acknowledged that
it was "not unmindful of the hardships imposed by [the commanding general's ex-
clusion order] upon a large body of American citizens," id. at 219, and that "[n]othing
short of apprehension by the proper military authorities of the gravest imminent danger
to the public safety can constitutionally justify [such an order]." Id. at 218 (emphasis
added). "But when under conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by
hostile forces," said Justice Black for the Court, "the power to protect must be com-
mensurate with the threatened danger." Id. at 220.
46. 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black, Harlan & Stewart, JJ., concurring).
47. Although Professor Ely does not explicitly make immediacy the applicable test
for judging the validity of deviations from perfection, this does appear to be the thrust
of his statements regarding the best possible classification "under the circumstances,"
Ely, supra note 37, at CII, or "as the circumstances will allow." Id. at C12. Insofar
as this may not be the case, the writer of this Note assumes sole responsibility for
the formulation and its implications.
48. The concurring Justices insisted that, under the Court's affirmance, prison au-
thorities retained "the right, acting in good faith and in particularized circumstances,
to take into account racial tensions in maintaining security, discipline, and good order
in prisons and jails." 390 U.S. at 334. The state had contended that the district court's
order made "no allowance for the necessities of prison security and discipline," but
the Court, in its per curiam opinion, did "not so read the 'Order, Judgment and
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Although separating some black prisoners from some white prisoners
would almost certainly be unnecessary to further the goal of pre-
venting violence (since neither all blacks nor all whites would be
expected to demonstrate outward racial hostility), the classification
may be justified in an emergency as the best possible given the time
available for its formulation.49
This interpretation of "strict scrutiny," furthermore, helps explain
those suspect classification cases in which the law at issue was de-
clared invalid. Consider, for example, the landmark suspect classi-
fication case, Brown v. Board of Education."0 An arguably permis-
sible state objective for the laws at issue in Brown, laws requiring
or permitting segregation in public schools according to race, would
be to accelerate the education of youths according to their intel-
lectual abilities. The classification in Brown ostensibly attempted to
serve this goal by equating whites with those students most able to
accelerate and blacks with those least able.5' Although these equations
may have been true as general descriptive propositions, the classifi-
cation was obviously imperfect, in that it was both over- and under-
inclusive. Accordingly, the Court struck down the laws and thereby
forced the state to classify along nonracial lines (e.g., by aptitude
tests5 2) in pursuing lawful educational objectives.
53
Decree' of the district Court ....... Id. The concurring Justices sought "to make
explicit something that is left to be gathered only by implication from the Court's
opinion." Id.
49. Professor Ely argues that Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964), another per
curiam opinion, may also be read as authority for a test requiring the best classifi-
cation possible under the circumstances. Ely, supra note 37, at C12-13. The law at
issue required that all divorce decrees denote the race of each spouse, apparently for
purposes of generating comprehensive vital statistics. Professor Ely argues that the per-
fection of this classification explains the Court's willingness to uphold this law, and
the court below indeed appeared to proceed on such a theory, Hamm v. Virginia
State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156, 158 (E.D. Va. 1964). The Court's failure to
elucidate the basis for its affirmance, however, leaves open the possibility that the
Court proceeded on another theory: that the law under review harmed no one (by
stigma or otherwise) and thus raised no equal protection issue at all.
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. Cf. Brief for Att'y Gen. of Fla. as Amicus Curiae at 19-20, Brown v. Board
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
52. Whether an aptitude test exists that will give a fair, racially-neutral reflection of
intellectual abilities is of course debatable. On aptitude tests and pupil assignment,
see Jones v. School Bd., 278 F.2d 72, 77 (4th Cir. 1960); Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d
268, 271 (9th Cir. 1957). But cf. Still v. Board of Educ., 387 F.2d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1967).
53. Although Brown has taken on the status of the suspect classification case, the
Court's opinion in Brown makes no mention of "suspect classification" and appears
to rely exclusively on a fundamental right to an equal education. It is the companion
case to Brown, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), that enunciates the suspect
status of classification by race. Since San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), holds that education is not a fundamental interest, Brown
can sensibly be viewed only as a suspect classification case. Thus, Rodriguez appears
to have made Brown's landmark status secure even among those who may take the
language in Brown literally.
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Subsequent per curiam opinions resting on the authority of Brown
also vindicate this interpretation of "strict scrutiny." Basically, these
decisions declaring segregated public facilities-beaches, 54 buses,55
courtrooms, 6 and golf courses57-to be in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment implicitly state the general rule from which the Lee
concurrence carves an exception. Thus, as in the Lee racial violence
hypothetical, the permissible state goal is the preservation of order, 8
A classification by race could serve this goal by minimizing contact
among two groups in society likely to be antagonistic to one another
-the white and black races. Again, the basic proposition may be
plausible: Given the generally prevailing social and cultural dif-
ferences between the races, friction between a white and a black
is arguably more probable than between two whites or two blacks.
In the Lee hypothetical the imminent threat of violence would ex-
cuse a racial classification as the best that could be managed by
prison authorities in the brief time available to them. On the other
hand, unless there is a discernible cause for immediate imposition of
a racial classification on a beach or golf course, the patently im-
perfect racial classification of segregated facilities would be imper-
missible. Authorities would be denied the convenient racial short-
hand and remitted to case-by-case determinations of which individuals
are likely to be disruptive. Some may object that the latter course
will be prohibitively expensive. And so it may. But cost is not a con-
sideration relevant to the constitutionality of a suspect classification.
A final illustration of the general validity of this analytic method
is Graham v. Richardson,9 the occasion for the Court's announce-
ment that classification by alienage is suspect. The laws challenged
in Graham deprived aliens of welfare benefits awarded to equally
needy United States citizens residing in the state. Two permissible
state goals appear to inform the classification: maintaining welfare
expenditures at a level compatible with other demands on the state's
purse and giving preferential treatment to those state residents likely
to have contributed more, monetarily or otherwise, to the common-
weal.60 The state's classification scheme was not irrational. But strict
54. Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
55. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
56. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
57. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955). See Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (restaurant in public building); New Orleans City Park Im-
provement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks).
58. See Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 17, Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 350
U.S. 877 (1955).
59. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
60. cf. id. at 372-76.
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scrutiny demands perfection in classification unless considerations of
immediacy obtain. The Court was thus obliged to declare the wel-
fare laws under review in Graham to be unconstitutional. Perhaps
other devices for giving priority to the most deserving residents,
devices avoiding the defect of over- and underinclusiveness, may be
too expensive to implement. Again, however, imperfection in a sus-
pect classification is not excused by cost considerations.
If strict scrutiny demands perfection in classification absent con-
ditions requiring immediate reaction, a possible explanation of what
the Court finds so suspicious about suspect classifications emerges.
Basically, the Court may be sensitive to classifications by race, alien-
age, or nationality because it distrusts the process by which such clas-
sifications are generated. This suspicion of the legislative process
may derive from legislators' unfitness to weigh the costs and benefits
of greater individualization in classification when they classify along
these suspect lines. For in such instances they may have personal
stakes which skew their perceptions of the cost-benefit balance.
A closer look at the classification process brings this problem of
bias into relief. A legislative classification rests upon a stereotypical
comparison of two classes of persons. For example, legislators may
believe that persons in class A (doctors) are generally better qualified
than those in class B (chiropractors) in several respects, thus justifying
the classification made (doctors may prescribe medicines and chiro-
practors may not). Since presumably few legislators are doctors or
chiropractors, there is-at least in the absence of external evidence to
the contrary-little reason to suppose that this comparison is tainted
with self-interest. Focusing, then, on those vested with formal au-
thority to make the above classification and on those affected by
the classification, one is led to presume that the legislation is basi-
cally objective and fair. If members from either of the two classes
being compared constitute a majority of the legislature, however, the
comparative generalizations and cost-benefit balances made are in-
herently untrustworthy for a number of reasons. First, in comparing
us (whites) to them (blacks), members of the predominantly white
legislature may, because of the not uncommon human desire to af-
firm one's own superiority, tend to assume the good about us and
the bad about them. Similarly, because of an equally innate self-
centeredness, the legislators may be inclined to believe that the pro-
posed classification neither serves us too well nor them too poorly.
Accordingly, consciously or unconsciously, we, the legislators, skew
the balance in our favor by underestimating the benefit (the in-
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crease in fairness) to them from a more precise classification. The
presumption of legislative objectivity which would inform judicial
deference to a legislative they-they (doctor-chiropractor) balance is
out of place where a we-they balance is involved for yet another
reason: We are most likely to overestimate the costs of greater in-
dividualization when a more neatly-fitted classification would bring
more of them into equality with us. In essence, since the psychological
forces at work cast doubt upon the objective fairness of we-they
generalizations and balances, the courts0 ' properly give special scrutiny
to classifications made on the basis of such potentially biased gen-
eralizations and balances.
2
Classifications based on race, ancestry, and alienage, the three clas-
sifications explicitly given suspect status by the Court, arise in classic
we-they situations. Anytime we (a predominantly white, American-
born and descended legislature)0 3 compare ourselves to them (blacks,
aliens, and other persons of foreign ancestry), the court should closely
scrutinize the classification. If not perfect, the classification must be
justified in its imperfection by exigent circumstances.
It should be emphasized at this point that the goal served by the
classification need be only permissible, not compelling. Thus, if the
classification is perfect or justifiably imperfect, the reviewing court
should not proceed to inquire into how compelling the asserted state
interest is. Although some might think such substantive testing desir-
able, the Court does not appear in its holdings to have committed
itself to test for a compelling state interest. 4 Indeed, if, as main-
tained, the Court's concern in suspect classification cases is with
purity of process rather than with a specific substantive interest (as
is the case when a deprivation of First Amendment 3 or other "fun-
damental" rights is the issue), it seems inappropriate for the Court
to test for a compelling state interest.
61. The point is not that we-they generalizations made by courts are more trust-
worthy than those made by legislatures. Given their typical insulation from popular
accountability, courts may well be less competent to perform such a task. But they
can nevertheless decide when no one, including themselves, should be allowed to
generalize. Thus, the issue before the Court in suspect classification cases is not who
should generalize and balance but whether anyone should. See Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf, supra note 37, at 933 n.85. On bias in adjudicatory contexts, see, e.g.,
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57
(1972).
62. This paragraph essentially tracks Professor Ely's theory. Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf, supra note 37, at 933 n.85.
63. If the numerical imbalance in a legislature were redressed, classifications which
were once we-they and suspect would lose that status. But cf. id.
64. See Ely, supra note 37, at C14.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965).
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If many, including members of the present Court, share a con-
trary view,66 the confusion appears to derive from three sources.07
First, deprivation of a fundamental interest does trigger a com-
pelling state interest test. In some fundamental interest decisions
long assumed by many scholars and courts to rest on: suspect clas-
sification grounds as well (or, perhaps, on these latter grounds alone), 68
the Court's discussion of compelling state interests may have con-
fused the issue. Also tending to obscure the issue is the fact that
some suspect classification cases were decided on the basis of a find-
ing of no lawful state interest.6 9 In this group of cases the Court
may even allude to an "overriding" state interest doctrine,70 but the
cases rest in fact on the application of the far less rigorous and in-
terventionist permissible state interest test. Finally, the emphasis on
emergency circumstances in the Japanese internment cases and in the
Lee v. Washington concurrence might easily be read as a discussion
of the compelling state interest doctrine. The Court discussed these
exigencies, however, only to justify its allowance of an imperfect
classification which was the best that authorities could manage with-
in the short time available for the classification's formulation; the
Court's discussion was not an independent evaluation of the extent
to which the state interest involved was compelling. The distinction
is a crucial one: Even where the classification is perfect, the com-
pelling state interest doctrine would require the reviewing court to
assess the state's objective and invalidate the law if it found the in-
terest not sufficiently compelling; on the other hand, if the test re-
quires only the most precise classification possible within given
temporal limitations, perfection in classification ends the matter.
66. See p. 1268 infra. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972) (dictum),
the Court cited Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), a suspect classification case, as
authority for requiring a showing of a compelling state interest.
67. This elucidation of sources is not part of Professor Ely's thesis.
68. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). For commentary expressly or implicitly reading these
cases as authority for wealth as a suspect classification, see G. GUNTHER 8 N. DOWLIN6,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1011-12, 1018-19 (8th ed. 1970); Willcox & Bloustein, The Griffin
Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 9-10 (1957); Note,
Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARV. L. ReV.
435, 437-38 (1967); Note, New Vistas in Protecting the Indigent: Rewriting Griffin and
Douglas, 4 SUFF. U.L. REv. 485, 499 (1970); 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 189, 193 (1967).
69. See discussion of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and Anderson v. Martin,
375 U.S. 399 (1964), in note 40 supra and the accompanying text.
70. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967):
There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial
discrimination which justifies this classification. . . . [T]he racial measures must
stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.
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B. Political Realities and the Legislative Process
1. The Limits of the We-They Analysis
Since this we-they theory attempts to articulate what has moved
the Court to declare some classifications suspect, the theory would
fail on its own terms unless it affirmed the suspect status of the
few classifications bearing the Court's imprimatur of suspicion. On
the other hand, this theory must exclude from possible suspect status
those classifications that the Court would almost intuitively regard
as beyond suspicion-or at least unsuspicious enough that society's
resources would best be allocated by allowing legislatures to employ
such classifications.
A few examples should illustrate the problem:
Case One. The legislature of State X is composed principally of
psychiatrists. It passes a law prohibiting psychologists from ad-
ministering shock therapy. Psychologists from that state bring a
class action claiming a denial of equal protection and seeking
invalidation of the law.
If the we-they theory alone explains suspect classifications, the psy-
chologists should win the case. The comparative we-they generali-
zation explaining the classification must be: We (psychiatrists) are
more qualified than they (psychologists) in terms of the education
and abilities needed to administer shock treatment safely and wisely.
Now most psychiatrists are probably more competent to administer
shock treatments than most psychologists, but some psychologists are
undoubtedly more competent than some psychiatrists to perform this
task. Thus, although the classification is rational, it is far from per-
fect. It seems unlikely, however, that the courts would invalidate
this under- and overinclusive law and thereby burden the system
with the case-by-case determinations required to assure more precise
service of the goal.
Case Two. Lawyers predominate in the legislature of State Y.
The legislature enacts an attorney-client privilege but fails to
pass a bill establishing an accountant-client privilege. The state's
accountants bring a class action claiming a denial of equal pro-
tection and asking the court to extend an analogous privilege
to them.
Again, a court adhering to the we-they theory alone as the touch-
stone for suspect classifications should grant relief to the plaintiffs.
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Assuming (for purposes of this illustration) that the legislative pur-
pose is to protect business health,"' the comparative generalization
explaining the classification is: We (lawyers) need this privilege to
protect our businesses more than they (accountants) need one to pro-
tect theirs.72 But even if most lawyers need this privilege more than
most accountants to retain their clientele, surely some accountants
need it more than some lawyers. Given this imperfection in classi-
fication and the absence of any apparent justification for it, the
suspect classification could not stand. It somehow seems dubious,
though, that a court would demand anything approaching perfection
in this classification or, indeed, that it would even find this law at
all suspicious.
2. A Needed Refinement of the Theory
Although the we-they relationship of legislators and persons being
classified is a necessary characteristic of suspect classification, the
above illustrations intimate the presence of at least one other neces-
sary characteristic. The missing criterion must remedy the we-they
theory's obvious overinclusiveness. This criterion may be that the
they-group be politically impotent, a prototype of the "discrete and
insular minorities" of which Mr. Justice Stone speaks in his famous
Carolene Products footnote."3 The examples above illustrate the need
to modify the theory of suspect classifications to take account of po-
litical realities-specifically, the presence of powerful lobbies repre-
senting groups with little or no actual representation in the legis-
71. Though almost certainly secondary to other legislative goals (e.g., buttressing the
adversary process by encouraging clients to confide in counsel, this goal is at least
arguably present. See In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 427-29, 467 P.2d 557, 564-66, 82
Cal. Rptr. 647, 654-56 (1970) (defendant's contention).
72. Professor Ely focuses exclusively on the suspect nature of we-they generalizations
as to comparative qualifications. Equally suspect under his theory would be we-they
generalizations as to comparative need. Suppose Congress passes a, law establishing a
salary ratio of 3:2 at all civil service grades for men and women, respectively. The
basis for this distinction is the we-they generalization that men are generally in greater
need of money than women since families rely on the man for support. This self-
serving generalization ought to be regarded as suspect. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), is despicable in large part because it callously affirms a gross misrepresentation
of comparative need: We [whites] need public facilities to be segregated more than
they [blacks] need them not to be. Thus eight members of the all-white Court showed
great solicitude for the comfort and happiness of whites and brushed aside the com-
peting claim of blacks for human dignity:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found
in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it.
Id. at 551. But see id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
73. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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lature.74 Thus, if intuition would suggest that the psychologists in
Case One and the accountants in Case Two would meet with little
success in court, perhaps the explanation lies in a tacit recognition
of their participation in the legislative process through indirect
channels.
Adding the intangible element of political power to the theory
does destroy the neatness of nose-counting (all that is apparently re-
quired by we-they). On the other hand, it does not, with its emphasis
on polar cases, seem to call upon the courts to make findings on,
or take judicial notice of, legislative facts75 more difficult to ascer-
tain than usual.76 Although a court should strive for an overview
of all relevant characteristics in assessing a they-group's "outsider"
status, four criteria would seem to be particularly relevant to this
determination. The first is whether the group has the right to vote.
An answer either way should not in itself determine the court's
ultimate finding as to political impotence and suspect classification.
If the class cannot vote, Oregon v. Mitchell 77 cautions against con-
74. Unparalleled for the insight which it offers on such matters is H. LASSWELL,
POLITICS: WHO GETs WHAT, WHEN, How (1958), especially at 13-27. A recent illustration
of this approach to public decisions and a brief summary of its various aspects may
be found in Reisman & Simson, Interstate Agreements in the American Federal System,
27 RuTGERS L. REv. 70, 70-74, 81-82 (1973).
75. On findings and official notice of legislative as compared to adjudicative facts
by the courts, see 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.03 (1958), and cases
cited therein. In general,
When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the immediate parties-who did
what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent-the court or agency is
performing an adjudicative function and the facts are conveniently called adju-
dicative facts. When a court or an agency develops law or policy, it is acting
legislatively; the courts have created the common law through judicial legislation,
and the facts which inform the tribunal's legislative judgment are called legislative
facts.
Id. at 353.
76. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 39-43 (1969); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.ll (1954).
77. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). In Mitchell the Court held that Congress had no authority
under § five of the Fourteenth Amendment to lower the voting age in state elections
to 18. Though lacking the right to vote, 18 to 21 year olds did not, said the Court,
need protection (at least not in the form of an extension of the right to vote to
them) against discrimination. One implication of this holding would seem to be that
youth is not a suspect classification, from which it would follow that inability to vote
does not in itself qualify the they-group for suspect status.
The Court may not, though, have definitively voted youth "out" as a suspect clas-
sification. Three of the five Justices concurring in striking down the state elections pro-
vision in Mitchell pointed to § two of the Fourteenth Amendment for support:
Moreover, so long as a State does not set the voting age higher than 21, the rea-
sonableness of its choice is confirmed by the very Fourteenth Amendment upon
which the Government relies. Section 2 of that Amendment provides for sanctions
when the right to vote "is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States .... "
Id. at 295. To similar effect, see N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1970, § 4, at 13, col. 1 (letter of
Professors Bickel, Black, Bork. Ely, Pollak, and Rostow). Although the Court has never
explicitly held that § two affirms the reasonableness of 21 as a voting age, its treatment of
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cluding automatically that it is an outsider group and thus that we-
they classifications involving it are suspect. On the other hand, a
class that can vote may still be an outsider group and we-they classi-
fications involving it may still be suspect: Blacks can vote, but they
may still be effectively excluded from the political process. Though
neither sufficient nor necessary to support a finding of outsider
status, a group's inability to vote at least suggests that its input in
the political process will be relatively meager.
The second consideration is whether the group is a minority in
the general population. Again, a "yes" or "no" answer is not dis-
positive for purposes of the determination of political impotence:
Many minority groups-e.g., doctors and lawyers-are quite potent
politically; on the other hand, Mr. Justice Stone's "discrete and in-
sular minorities" notwithstanding, a they-group merits the protec-
tion of the scrutiny given suspect classifications whether it is in the
majority"s or minority as long as it is politically powerless. A group's
minority status is relevant, though, in that it may suggest an in-
ability, even with the vote, to protect the group's interests in the
political arena.
The third consideration is how insular the group is. If a class
does not interact with other groups in society, one might infer that
it would lack any surrogate voices (if it cannot vote) or complemen-
tary voices (if it can) in its behalf in the political process. Neverthe-
less, insularity would not seem a sufficient characteristic of outsider
the other classifications ostensibly legitimated for voting purposes by the express lan-
guage of § two (i.e., sex, state residency, United States citizenship, and commission of
a felony) supports such an inference. Basically, since the right to vote has been held
to be a "fundamental interest," Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966),
one might anticipate that any classification for voting purposes would be subjected
to strict scrutiny and, hence, tested for a compelling state interest. But the Court
regularly defers to classification by residency and citizenship, see, e.g., Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625 (1969), and has recently summarily affirmed an
exclusion of felons from the franchise, Fincher v. Scott, 411 U.S. 961 (1973), a[f'g 352
F. Supp. 117 (M.D.N.C. 1972). In Fincher, furthermore, the lower court explicitly rested
the validity of the classification on § two of the Fourteenth Amendment. 352 F. Supp.
at 119. See also Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 452 (2d Cir. 1967). (Clas-
sification by sex for voting purposes lacks any similar authority because the Nine-
teenth Amendment presumably supersedes § two's delegation of authority to dis-
criminate among voters on the basis of sex.)
If age discrimination for voting purposes derives its constitutionality from § two
of the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, perhaps Mitchell may be read as simply a
"voting case," i.e., an illustration of the special status carved out by § two for dis.
criminations among potential voters, and not a statement by the Court on the un-
suspect nature of classification on the basis of youth. The implication of this reading
of Mitchell in terms of the voting criterion for political impotence would be that in-
ability to vote indicates an outsider group at least where it can also be shown that
the they-group has no effective surrogates in the political arena. On surrogates, see
note 79 infra and accompanying text.
78. On one majority group, women, see notes 79, 81 infra.
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groups-at least insofar as the they-group has chosen this insularity
(e.g., "high" society)-nor a necessary one-at least where the non-
insular they-group for other reasons lacks surrogate or complementary
voices in the political process.
7 9
The final consideration is whether the group has been repeatedly
disadvantaged or stigmatized 0 by legislative classifications. Generally,
where a they-group has suffered harm with great frequency as the
result of past and present imperfect classifications, one might well
infer that it lacks effective input into the political process. This last
consideration perhaps comes closest to a sufficient and necessary char-
acteristic of outsider groups.8'
This revised we-they theory would still embrace the three classi-
fications declared suspect by the Court -82 and, at the same time, ex-
clude numerous classifications seemingly beyond suspicion. They-
groups like psychologists and accountants, therefore, plainly could
not invoke the protection of this suspect classification theory: Any
79. Even though a they-group interacts with various other groups in society, a court
might find that denial of the vote to members of the group is not remedied by the
presence of ostensible surrogates. The court may decide that an ostensible surrogate
is not a surrogate at all because the supposed stand-in has interests frequently adverse
to those of the members of the class for which it appears to speak. A court appro-
priately receptive to all relevant characteristics of the they-group, therefore, might
find in denial of the vote to juveniles some evidence that the classification is suspect
on the theory that parents have interests in sufficient conflict with the they-group's
to make them poor stand-ins for the latter. The presence of a pattern of discriminatory
legislation, the fourth criterion, see text accompanying note 80 infra, would be a strong
indication to a court of such an inherent conflict of interests where surrogates seem to
exist. The same considerations would obtain, though perhaps not as forcefully, where
complementary voices are the issue. Thus, in gauging the political potency of women
(pursuant to an inquiry into the suspect status of classification by sex), a court would
want to consider that husbands, whose voting power would ostensibly complement
women's, in fact have interests in sufficient conflict with women's. See, e.g., M. HASKELL,
FROM REVERENCE TO RAPE 14 (1973); K. MILLEmrT, SEXUAL POLITICS 66-73 (1969). Ac-
cordingly, the political power of the they-group (women) would be largely limited to
their own exercise of the franchise and not be supported with any degree of con-
sistency by a complementary voice.
80. Although stigma is regarded as simply one type of disadvantage, see p. 1243
supra, both terms are used in the accompanying text to avoid any inference that
laws singling out a they-group for "advantage"-e.g., a law providing that women
cannot be drafted-may not be harmful and in fact indicative of discriminatory treat-
ment. See note 92 infra.
81. Indeed, in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973), where four of
the Justices concurred that sex is a suspect classification, the plurality opinion ap-
peared to place primary reliance on this criterion. See also San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401,
507-08 (D D.C. 1967), remanded on other grounds sub non. Smuck v. Hobson, 402
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
82. Thus, as to race, the they-group (blacks) would satisfy the latter three criteria;
as to alienage, the they-group (aliens) would meet all four (satisfaction of the fourth
criterion is elucidated in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-76 (1971), and wit-
nessed in the "special public interest" doctrine, Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)); and
as to nationality, the they-group (foreign nationals) will have some nonvoting members
(aliens), be a minority, and be insular and suffer disadvantage in classification in vary-
ing degrees according to the identity of the particular nationality. Although this
checklist of relevant considerations provides a useful reference, it should be recalled
that the test is political impotence, not satisfaction of any set number of these criteria.
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inference of political impotence arising out of their minority status
in the society at large would be soundly dispelled by their retention
of the franchise, interaction with a multitude of other groups, and,
by all indications, failure to experience repeated disadvantage in the
classification process. But, again, these criteria are only illustrative,
not exhaustive, of those which a court might wish to consider in its
estimation of a group's political impotence. Mechanical application
of the suggested criteria would run counter to the basic thrust of the
test for political power, which must be attuned to the political reali-
ties of the world outside the courtroom. It is with attention to such
realities, then, that the qualifications of the class of persons labelled
mentally ill for admission to the suspect circle should be judged.
III. Application of the Theory to Classification on the Basis of
Mental Illness
A. The Suspect Nature of Classification by Mental Illness
The sine qua non for mental illness to qualify as a suspect clas-
sification is numerical domination of legislatures by persons not men-
tally ill. Except perhaps in moments of acute pessimism about the
human condition,8 3 any court could be expected to take judicial no-
tice of the they-status of the mentally ill.84 Accordingly, legislative
classification on the basis of mental illness is easily subject to the
we-they analysis.
Moreover, suspicion seems especially appropriate when this par-
ticular we-group, "normal" persons, compares itself to this particular
they-group, the mentally ill. The usual tendencies to assume the
good about us and the bad about them and to be solicitous of our
needs and callous to theirs become exaggerated. Like the other forces
at work that cast suspicion on we-they generalizations, this exag-
gerating force partakes of psychology and the subconscious.85 We
83. For the proposition that we are all mentally ill, see SCHWARTZ & SCHWARTZ,
supra note 28, at 14.
84. Although a large body of opinion holds that everyone is capable, given suffi-
cient stress, of becoming mentally ill, id. at 13, one should not conclude from this
that legislators will therefore identify with the mentally ill and, hence, that the men-
tally ill do not comprise a they-group. On the strong contrary tendency of "normal"
persons to disassociate themselves as much as possible from the mentally ill, see pp. 1258-
59 infra.
85. In Freudian terms, see S. FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID 18-29 (2d ed. 1960), it
is the defensive reaction of our (normal persons') egos to the threat posed to our
superegos by expressions of deviant behavior. These expressions awaken our own re-
pressed impulses. When legislators enact laws that affirm our differences from them,
the ego is giving authoritative support to the superego and thereby strengthening its
own powers to keep deviant impulses in check; cf. F. ALEXANDER & H. STAUB, THE
CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC 214-15 (1956).
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all fear turning into them and thus are only too ready to assuage
these fears by telling ourselves how unlike them we really are.86
Accordingly, we will generalize strongly in our favor in comparing
us to them and will underestimate, even more than might otherwise
be anticipated in we-they situations, the benefits to them of greater
precision in classification. Similarly, in obeying our subconscious de-
sire to distance us from them, we will overestimate, even more than
usual, the costs of treating them as equals.8 7
Finally, as one of the foremost "discrete and insular minorities,"
the mentally ill warrant the special judicial solicitude reserved for
other politically impotent they-groups: We-they classifications on the
basis of mental illness should be treated as constitutionally suspect.
The political impotence of the mentally ill is manifest in terms of
the four criteria enumerated above for outsider status. In the various
states the mentally ill will almost certainly meet three and often four
of these criteria: They may be deprived of the right to vote;88 they
are (notwithstanding the opinion of psychologists who would have us
believe that everyone is mentally ill) s9 invariably in the minority;
they are, as a result of "normal" persons' aversion to personal contact
with them, regularly consigned to insularity; and they are typically
victimized by ill-fitting legislative classifications."0
B. The Impact of Strict Scrutiny on Laws Classifying on the Basis
of Mental Illness
If mental illness is indeed a suspect classification, then courts are
bound to give strict scrutiny to any law employing this classification.
To be upheld, therefore, the classification must be perfect or satisfy
86. See R. DONNELLY, J. GoLDSrEIN & R. SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAw 819 (1962), quoting
S. Star, The Public's Ideas about Mental Illness, 1955 (unpublished paper presented to
the 1955 Annual Meeting of the National Association for Mental Health).
87. In reviewing civil commitment laws (as contrasted, for example, with laws pro-
hibiting mentally ill persons from practicing certain professions), a court may be right
to assume that the legislative cost-benefit balance for mental illness classifications is
particularly untrustworthy. Given the anxiety which the mentally ill produce in "us"
about our own sanity, the possibility of removing the mentally ill from sight-the pos-
sibility offered by commitment laws-would seem to invite misjudgment. As one com-
mentator has flatly suggested:
A fourth function [of commitment] . . . is one that legislatures would be em-
barrassed to express in statutory language and state courts unwilling to acknowl-
edge: Commitment serves to remove from sight those who make us feel uncom-
fortable. An ill person may pose no physical threat to our person or property yet
unsettle us when we encounter him. Even if silent and withdrawn, he may cause
us to worry about our own stability and create anxieties about our own sanity.
Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment, 70 MIcH. L. REv. 1107, 1119-20 (1972).
88. See p. 1267 infra.
89. See note 83 supra.
90. See pp. 1260-68 infra.
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the narrow immediacy exception for imperfection. Although this
standard does not call for substantive testing,'91 strict scrutiny of
laws classifying on the basis of mental illness does, as the following
discussion will hopefully demonstrate, produce dramatic results.92
1. Laws Regulating the Civil Commitment Process
a. The Constitutional Attack on Commitment Standards
Prominent among the laws brought under strict scrutiny would
be those governing who can be civilly committed. Consider first
the commonly found law authorizing the detention of any person
mentally ill and dangerous to others.93 If the legislature's purpose
91. See pp. 1251-52 supra.
92. The method of judicial review set out in the text below differs significantly
from that suggested by Professor Ely. He argues that only those specific laws rooted
in a "suspicious" we-they comparative generalization-i.e., we are superior to or more
qualified than they are in the following respects-should be regarded as suspect. Ely,
supra note 37, at C28-41. This unnecessarily confuses the issue and gives the courts an
onerous, if not highly artificial, task to perform. That we-they generalizations and
balances are by their nature suspicious is crucial to explain why we-they classifications
are suspect. There is simply no need, however, to delve into legislative motive in each
case in search of a suspicious-looking generalization. Having decided that a given clas-
sification is we-they and thus suspect, one can then assume that a law employing that
classification merits strict scrutiny, i.e., that the generalizations made and balances struck
are tainted by the personal interests of the we-group. If the classification is perfect
or imperfect but excused by exigent circumstances, the classification will survive
nonetheless.
In insisting upon focusing on the underlying generalization, Professor Ely is appar-
ently concerned to avoid invalidating laws designed to promote integration or to
compensate the they-group for discrimination practiced against them. Such laws are
not, he asserts, rooted in suspicious comparative generalizations. But the laws to pro-
mote integration are no problem in any case. For as Professor Ely himself points out
earlier in his essay, id. at C13-14, many of these laws embody a perfect classification:
Every student bused, for example, serves the objective of integrating the schools. Such
laws would therefore survive even strict scrutiny. Among the second group of statutes-
those which compensate for societal prejudices-Professor Ely would include a law
providing an extra tax exemption for blacks (since many blacks are "consigned by
societal prejudices to jobs financially less rewarding than their qualifications would
indicate they should be doing," id. at C29-30) and protective wage and hour legisla-
tion for women (since, "because of societal prejudice, women would be less capable
than men of equal qualification of protecting themselves at the bargaining table,"
id. at C38-39). It is not at all clear that one should want to rescue these laws. They
seem no less stigmatizing, and thus harmful, to the they-group than others also de-
signed to favor the they-group but less elegantly cloaked in neutral, inoffensive gen-
erality-e.g., laws keeping women out of especially dangerous occupations (read: "they
[women] are frailer than we [men] are"). In any event the Court may soon express
sts opinion on the matter when it decides the legality of a quota system which has
the argable effect of excluding some white applicants to law school who would
otherwise have been admitted. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169,cert. granted, 94 5. Ct. 538 (1973).
The search for the suspicious generalization can thus be a highly subjective exercise.
A more value-neutral test would subject every law based on a suspect classification,
one of a we-they nature where the they-group is politically impotent, to strict scrutiny.
The latter course is followed in this Note.
93. See, e.g., CAL. WELt. & INs5r'NS CoDE § 5150 (West 1972). See generally BRAK.L
& RocK, supra note 1, at 72-76 (Table 3.2).
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in enacting this law is simply to ensure public safety, the statute
is plainly underinclusive and thus, under the applicable standard,
invalid. Indeed, the classification is arguably so arbitrary as perhaps
to fail to survive the rational relation test to which classifications
which are not suspect are subjected. 94 As long as the dangerousness
standard is a constant, dangerous persons not mentally ill are by defi-
nition just as dangerous (as a group) as dangerous persons who are
mentally ill. Thus, if protecting the populace is the only goal of
the statute, then institutionalizing only mentally ill dangerous per-
sons does not logically follow.
The state can, however, advance a secondary purpose; the classi-
fication may then be more defensible. For example, the state might
claim that the statute seeks to reach only dangerous persons who can
be treated for their dangerous proclivities (and thereby restored to
upright, productive citizens). This decision about allocating the state's
resources and the classification chosen to implement that decision
would arguably be immune from successful attack under the ra-
tional connection standard of Railway Express Agency v. New York. 95
The law could not, however, survive the strict scrutiny mandated
for suspect classifications. Since some mentally ill dangerous persons
are not treatable"" and some persons dangerous but mentally sound
are treatable, 97 the law is both under- and overinclusive and there-
fore invalid.
State laws also typically provide for the civil coImitment of per-
sons mentally ill and dangerous to themselves.98 If the state's purpose
is simply to protect people from seriously injuring themselves, the
94. But see Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). ("It is
no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or
none at all.")
95. Id. See note 7 supra.
96. See Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. Cm. L.
REV. 755, 779 (1969). On the untreatable patient generally, see Note, Conditioning and
Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental
Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616, 652 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Conditioning
and Other Technologiesl; Note, Hospitalization of Mentally Ill Criminals in Pennsyl-
vania and New Jersey, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 78, 85-88 (1961).
97. Cf. Singer, Psychological Studies of Punishment, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 405, 433 (1970):
Given the time and the resources, a behavior therapy program could make a bank
robber want to vomit every time he saw a bank, could make an armed robber
shudder every time he saw a gun. As experimenters have successfully conditioned
verbal and imaginal stimuli, such a program could also induce these reactions
whenever the convicted thief even thought or talked about guns and banks.
For a survey of the various modern techniques of behavior control, see Note, Condi-
tioning and Other Technologies, supra note 96, at 616-33. On the potential for indi-
vidual and societal metamorphosis in these techniques, see generally J. DELGADO, PHYSICAL
CONTROL OF THE MIND (1969); B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOm AND DIGNITY (1971).
98. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5150 (West 1972). See generally BRAKL &
ROCK, supra note 1, at 72-76 (Table 3.2).
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classification would not even seem to qualify as rational,0 for we
legislators, working hard and long hours, may be just as dangerous
to ourselves as they, with their deranged mental condition, are to
themselves. 0 Such a law is simply far too underinclusive to with-
stand strict scrutiny. Moreover, whether the state, coming forward
with a secondary objective, could rescue the law from invalidation
seems dubious. The treatment rationale suggested earlier, i.e., we
(legislators) only want to detain those (the mentally ill) who can be
treated for their condition, is no more satisfactory in this context
than in the previous one. The state might allege, however, that its
purpose is to treat those who need treatment but are unable to
make a reasoned decision to seek or not to seek such treatment: Again,
the mental illness classification would fall. On the one hand, the
mentally ill are not uniformly characterized by an inability to make
a rational decision to seek treatment; some seek voluntary commit-
ments. The classification is thus overinclusive. On the other hand,
normality is no guarantee of objective decisionmaking abilities. For
example, "normal" persons often postpone a visit to the doctor until
after an important business trip or a primary race even though an
objective third party would recognize the immediate necessity of
medical attention. The classification is, then, also underinclusive and
the law fails on both counts.
A third commitment statute found in many states is one authoriz-
ing the detentiorl of any person mentally ill and in need of treat-
ment.1' 1 The treatment objective is patent: We want to improve
their mental state in order to leave them better and happier persons.
Yet, to be consistent with this benign objective, the legislature should
extend its beneficence to all persons who fail to live and act as so-
ciety knows would be in their best interests. The patent impreci-
sion of this underinclusive classification would trigger its demise un-
der strict scrutiny.
It warrants emphasis, furthermore, that the state will be unable
to salvage these commitment laws by asserting a panoply of addi-
99. See note 94 supra.
100. See In Memory of Mr. justice Jackson. 349 U.S. XXVII, XXVIII-XXIX (1955)
(resolutions delivered by Solicitor General Sobeloff):
Associate Justice Robert Houghwout Jackson died suddenly of a heart attack on
Saturday, October 9, 1954, at the age of sixty-two and at the height of a brilliant
judicial career. . . . Justice Jackson had suffered a previous attack in the spring
of 1954. . . . His doctors gave him the choice between years of comparative
inactivity or a continuation of his normal activity at the risk of death at any
time. With characteristic fortitude he chose the second alternative.
101. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4406 (West 1969). See generally BRAKEL &
ROCK, supra note 1, at 72-76 (rable 3.2).
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tional purposes. Reflection on the stereotypical nature of the clas-
sification process should satisfy any doubts on the matter. Basically,
in classifying, "mental illness" serves as a shorthand for various goal-
related characteristics-e.g., dangerousness, need for treatment, de-
pendence-no one nor combination of which comprises a sufficiently
precise definition of the mentally ill. On the one hand, no goal-
related characteristic or characteristics exclude all persons not men-
tally ill; on the other, no such characteristic or characteristics em-
brace all persons mentally ill. Every goal asserted by the state to
justify the classification, then, bears within it the seed of over- and
underinclusiveness with regard to the class of mentally ill persons.
Combinations of goals simply fail to vindicate the classification in
varying degrees of over- and underinclusiveness. The burden of proof
placed on the state when it employs a suspect classification, therefore
-to demonstrate sheer perfection in classification or show temporal
justification for any imperfection-could not be met by ingenuity
in enumerating legislative goals. Accordingly, without necessarily im-
pugning the state's honesty in its elucidation of goals, a court would
almost inevitably find that the state has not established the validity
of its suspect classification.
b. Possible Reformulations of Commitment Standards
That current statutes would be invalid should not be understood
to imply that legislatures are impotent to promote by new legisla-
tion any of the lawful state objectives informing the old laws. Legis-
latures would simply be denied authority to classify on the basis of
mental illness to serve those goals. Thus, if the legislature's purpose
is to safeguard the public from dangerous persons, it must classify
on the basis of dangerousness. It must authorize the detention of
all dangerous persons, whether mentally ill or not. Although such
a law would survive scrutiny under the test proposed in this Note,
it might be politically unacceptable. This obstacle to the enactment
of a law which reaches all dangerous persons underlines a crucial
role of the Equal Protection Clause: to expose legislative purposes to
public scrutiny, a scrutiny customarily missing when laws affect only
the voiceless in society. As stated so well by Mr. Justice Jackson in
his Railway Express concurrence:
[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary
and unreasonable government than to require that the principles
of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be
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imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to ar-
bitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick
and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and
thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited
upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take
no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to re-
quire that laws be equal in operation. 102
If society demands preventive detention of all dangerous persons, it
will reelect legislators who enact preventive detention statutes. If so-
ciety is not willing to countenance so all-embracing a measure, how-
ever, the Equal Protection Clause proscribes legislative efforts to de-
tain only those dangerous persons who also happen to be mentally ill.
To limit the class of persons affected by the law, the legislature
might consider injecting a treatment rationale into the picture. The
statute would then reach only persons dangerous and treatable for
their dangerousness. Mental illness would not be the basis for com-
mitment nor would normality be an exemption from commitment.
The legislature might well decide, however, that the costs of ad-
ministering such a law would outweigh its benefits. Alternatively, if
the public strongly opposed involuntary commitment of those not
mentally ill, the legislature might also choose not to enact such a
law. In any event the legislature would be forced to face hard ques-
tions which it had previously avoided by employing a suspect clas-
sification and to shape its means more discriminately to effect its
ends. 0
3
A valid statute designed to reach persons "dangerous to themselves"
could also be formulated, but it, too, would have to differ dramat-
ically from its predecessors. If the state's objective is to protect peo-
ple from their own tendencies which seriously endanger their phys-
ical well-being, the law must cover many people whom society would
almost certainly not want to commit involuntarily. The businessman
too ready to sacrifice health for money, the judge too overzealous
in his public service, the mountain-climber unable to contain his
urge to climb still higher-they and many others all might be fit
subjects for commitment. Indeed, we as legislators might find our-
102. 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
103. The conclusive presumption cases raise similar considerations and require
analogous remedies. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 94 S. Ct. 791 (1974);
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) The principal difference between conclusive presumption
and suspect classification is that the latter disallows imperfect legislative classification,
while the former allows such imperfection provided an opportunity is afforded at the
administrative level for individuals to argue the imperfection as applied to them.
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selves in danger of losing our freedom. On the other hand, if the
legislature's purpose is to protect from themselves only those people
who are incompetent to decide whether to expose themselves to a
risk of serious physical harm, the law need take in a much smaller
class of persons. Thus tailored, the statute would almost surely re-
ceive public approbation. The mental illness classification would be
erased and a more discriminating one, one precisely fitted to the
legislative goal, placed in its stead.104
To be politically acceptable any statute which is aimed at per-
sons "in need of treatment" and which does not classify on the
basis of mental illness would probably have to be tailored along
similar lines. Unless the legislative purpose is narrowed to "improv-
ing" only those incompetent to decide for themselves the desirability
of such self-improvement, the law enacted would have to embrace
a substantial portion of society.105
c. Implications of Strict Scrutiny and Reformulated Standards for
Other Aspects of the Commitment Process
Strict scrutiny of commitment statutes would force the revision of
many of their procedural provisions. Presently, Baxstrom v. Herold'0°
is the principal authority for judicial expansion of the procedural
safeguards due those whom the state tries to commit. Read most
liberally, Baxstrom would require the state to grant similar pro-
cedural rights in all settings in which similar issues are decided.
The demanding test activated by declaring mental illness to be a
suspect classification would give certainty to the validity of this ex-
104. The underinclusiveness of mental illness classifications is thus the primary focus
in this reformulation process. Legislatures are forced to impose generally those standards
which they had previously imposed on only the mentally ill; cf. pp. 1263-64 supra.
Overinclusiveness is relevant, however, insofar as it evidences (1) the tendency of
the we-group to underestimate the increase in fairness to the mentally ill from more
precise classification, and (2) the readiness of the we-group to classify in a manner
which affirms "our" distance from "them." See pp. 1250-51 supra.
105. The viability of other lines of constitutional attack on these revised statutes-
e.g., due process, cruel and unusual punishment-is a matter beyond the scope of
this Note.
106. 383 U.S. 107 (1966). In Baxstrom the Court reviewed New York procedures for
the civil commitment of persons at the expiration of a prison term. In accordance
with state law petitioner Baxstrom was civilly committed at the end of his two-and-
a-half to three year term without the benefit of a jury trial, which is allowed all
other classes of persons who challenge their commitments. Additionally, by adminis-
trative decision Baxstrom was placed in a hospital maintained by the Department of
Corrections rather than a civil hospital; committed persons in any other class could
be sent to the Department of Corrections hospital only after a judicial proceeding in
which it was determined that they were too dangerous to be left in a civil hospital.
The Court held both classifications to be arbitrary and extended the same process to
Baxstrom and others committed at the end of their prison terms as granted to all
other persons for these issues.
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pansive reading of Baxstrom insofar as commitment procedures for
the mentally ill are concerned. Consider, for example, commitment
procedures under a law authorizing preventive detention of all dan-
gerous persons. (The previous "mentally ill and dangerous" statute
has long since been declared unconstitutional.) A procedural statute
prescribing different processes for committing persons dangerous and
mentally ill as opposed to persons dangerous and not mentally ill
would almost certainly not survive strict scrutiny. Thus, a jury trial
might in general be more emotionally disruptive to those dangerous
persons who are also mentally ill. Yet, the state cannot, in ostensibly
attempting to protect the defendant in a dangerousness hearing, classi-
fy on the basis of mental illness in granting the right to a jury trial.
Such a generalization fails to supply the perfection demanded, absent
unusually pressing circumstances, by the strict scrutiny standard.
Invalidation of such a law would leave the state with three op-
tions. If the state still wants to permit some jury trials, it would
have to single out, almost necessarily on a case-by-case basis, those
persons whose well-being would be most threatened by a jury trial.
Since such case-by-case determinations might well prove more costly
than simply awarding a jury trial to everyone, the state might in-
stead opt for the latter proposal. On the other hand, the state might
simply decide to deprive everyone, mentally ill and sound alike, of
the right to a jury trial in a dangerousness hearing. This deprivation
might be an unconstitutional denial of due process. 10 7 Whatever the
prospects of success for a due process challenge, however, suspect
classification theory has served its purpose: It has forced the legis-
lature to weigh the desirability of imposing a principle of law on
some of "us." Similar procedural consistency would, of course, be
required in committing persons under revised "dangerous to self"
or "in need of treatment" statutes, though a state could presumably
impose a different commitment procedure for each statute.
Once committed under one of the revised statutes, persons who
are also mentally ill could not, on the basis of that fortuity, be
deprived of privileges or comforts enjoyed by those not mentally
ill. Treatment, where that was a basis for commitment, must be
given according to what this patient requires to alleviate or cure the
condition that warranted his commitment.108 Finally, as with com-
107. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
108. On the right to treatment generally, see 1 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MIENTALLY
HANDICAPPED 275-92 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1973); Katz, supra note 96; Note,
Civil Restraint, Mental Illness and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1969).
The outer limit of judicial activism on this matter thus far is represented by Wyatt
v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
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mitment procedures and for the same reasons, the procedures for
termination of commitment under a given commitment statute would
have to be the same for those mentally ill and those not.
2. Laws Regulating Matters Other Than Commitment
Laws other than those governing the civil commitment of the
mentally ill would also be significantly affected by strict scrutiny.
Laws under which mental illness is a ground for trade license revo-
cation10  would be struck down. If the legislature wants to ensure
occupational fitness, it cannot simply make mental illness a short-
hand for unfitness. Even if most mentally ill persons might be unfit
to perform a certain trade, the crudeness of the classification under-
lying such a license revocation standard would require the law's
invalidation. Also unconstitutional would be statutes depriving men-
tally ill persons of the right to vote.110 The legislature may, of course,
promote informed, rational exercise of the ballot, but its classification
on the basis of mental illness is demonstrably over- and underin-
clusive. In pursuing this goal the state would have to be far more
discriminating in its selection of means. Whether mental illness is
an adequate basis for denying a person the right to manage his
property and property interests:"' also seems dubious. Even assuming
that most mentally ill people are, as a result of their illness, incom-
petent to manage property, some undoubtedly are competent to do
so; and similarly, even assuming that most persons not mentally ill
are competent to perform this task, some undoubtedly are not. Like
the licensing and voting statutes described above, these property laws
classifying on the basis of mental illness would fail for their over-
and underinclusiveness.
Similarly in danger of invalidation would be statutes which make
mental illness a ground for divorce or annulment,"12 sanction sterili-
109. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-59 (West 1958). See generally BRAKEL &
ROCK, supra note 1, at 326-32 (Table 9.3).
110. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-12 (West 1958). See generally BRAKEL &
RocK, supra note 1, at 333-39 (Table 9.4).
111. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 391 (West 1954). See generally BRAKEL & ROCK, supra
note 1, at 315-25 (Tables 9.1, 9.2). Insofar as a statute provides for the withdrawal of
certain property rights upon a determination that one is incompetent to exercise them,
no problems of suspect classification are implicated. But the legislature cannot single
out the mentally ill as a class incompetent to manage property interests even if it al-
lows an opportunity for rebuttal by individual members of the class at the adminis-
trative level. On this contrast between suspect classification and conclusive presumption
requirements, see note 103 supra.
112. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-19 (West 1958). See generally BRAKEL &
RocK, supra note 1, at 244-47 (Table 7.2).
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zation of mentally ill persons deemed likely to pass on to offspring
an inherited tendency to mental illness, 13 and disqualify the men-
tally ill from jury duty.114 Such laws classifying on the basis of mental
illness would fall unless the state could demonstrate that the classi-
fication is perfect or at least as precise as the time for its formulation
allowed. Strict scrutiny would therefore almost always force the legis-
lature to choose between serving its goals by unsuspect classifications
covering some of "us" and not serving these goals at all.
IV. The Burger Court and Suspect Classifications: Resolving an
Untimely Disinheritance
A constitutionally-based revolution in laws affecting the mentally
ill would thus follow from adding the mental illness classification to
the ranks of the suspect. But the Court's reluctance of late to create
any new suspect classifications would appear to make such a judi-
cially mandated metamorphosis unlikely.lla Perhaps, however, the
Court can be persuaded to change its ways.
First of all, the Court's reluctance to continue along the consti-
tutional path which it appears to have marked out for itself is prob-
ably ill-founded. As one commentator on the 1971 term has argued,10
the Court's failure to add to the number of suspect classifications
derives from its distaste for substantive testing: The Court would
like, he asserts, to avoid commitments to inquire into how com-
pelling the asserted state interest is (and then, if it finds the interest
sufficiently compelling, into whether less restrictive alternatives are
available). But if this explanation of the Court's recent decisions is
correct, 17 the Court has acted upon mistaken premises in at least
113. See, e.g., MicH. CoMe. LAWS ANN. §§ 720.301, 720.304 (West 1968). See generally
BRAKEL & Roca, supra note 1, at 220-23 (Table 6.1).
114. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-12 (West 1958), 51-217 (Supp. 1973). See
generally BRAKEL & RoCK, supra note 1, at 333-39 (Table 9.4).
115. Indeed on one occasion, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Court appeared
to go to great lengths to avoid adding any more classifications to the suspect list; cf.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691-92 (1973) (Stewart & Powell, JJ., concurring).
116. Gunther, supra note 11. For a sense of the still evolving nature of the doctrine,
compare San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-39 (1973),
and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion), with San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra at 98-110 (Marshall, J., dissenting), and
Frontiero v. Richardson, supra at 691-92 (Stewart & Powell, JJ., concurring).
117. There is language in some of that term's cases to support Gunther's analysis
of the Court's thinking. The Court's explicit disclaimer of substantive testing in Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, for example, appears to witness its general hypersensitivity to such activity:
Of course, if we were to conclude that the Massachusetts statute [prohibiting dis-
tribution of contraceptives to single persons] impinges upon fundamental freedoms
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some cases, for, as argued earlier, by declaring a classification suspect,
the Court would not, under its past holdings, bind itself to test for
a compelling state interest in future decisions. It need only analyze
the perfection of the classification; it need not second-guess legis-
latures as to the importance of the asserted lawful purposes.
Secondly, the Court's adoption of a sliding-scale rationality standard
may indicate that a Court cognizant of the nonsubstantive orienta-
tion of suspect classification scrutiny would prove far more willing
than now to create new suspect classifications. This is not to deny
that the admission of a new classification to the suspect circle would
run counter to the trend established by the Court's recent equal
protection decisions; rather, the contention is that, once the impli-
cations of such a move are properly understood, it will be seen to
be consistent with the rationale informing this latest line of cases.
Basically, then, the Court's development of the sliding-scale test seems
to demonstrate a desire on its part to force legislatures to fashion
classifications perfectly fitted, or nearly so, to their purposes. The
Court has apparently taken to heart the wise counsel of Mr. Justice
Jackson that "there is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must
be imposed generally."""
By demanding laws "equal in operation,""1 9 a court thus enlarges
the potentially affected public and thereby increases the likelihood
that these laws will receive careful public scrutiny. The politically
impotent they-group would then find politically potent allies with
a personal stake in disputing legislative goals, a result that bears a
crucial relation to the Court's reluctance to perform substantive test-
ing itself. If the Court indeed wants to forge a viable alternative to
substantive testing by the judiciary, the ostensible logical under-
pinning of its new sliding-scale formula, it would only be appropriate
for it to add to the list of suspect classifications. When the voiceless
they-group alone is affected, there may be no other voices heard.
The Court has never charged itself with defending politically im-
under Griswold, the statutory classification would have to be not merely rationally
related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the achievement of a compelling
state interest.
405 U.S. 438, 444 n.7 (1972) (dictum) (emphasis in original). But cf. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, supra note 37.
118. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
119. Id. at 113.
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potent they-groups from legislative ends, and perhaps rightly so. -12
But consistency with its construction of the Equal Protection Clause
in the past seems to require that the Court create spokesmen to
argue the outsider group's case in the political arena. In developing
sliding-scale rationality, the Court has intimated a willingness to ac-
cept this latter role. The Court could admirably affirm its assumption
of that role and its adherence to the unarticulated principles that
appear to inform its suspect classification decisions by declaring men-
tal illness a suspect classification.
120. See pp. 1251-52 supra.
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